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Barbara A. Cherry 
Legal Gaps Under Deregulatory Broadband Policies 





This paper considers the likely combinatorial effects of U.S. deregulatory broadband 
policies and the evolution of law as applied to corporations as a general matter.  It explains 
how legal developments in both areas have dismantled bodies of law or doctrines that had 
developed to address corporate power in both commercial and political spheres and to 
protect consumers from vulnerability in commercial activities.  Moreover, the coexistence 
of these developments enables an unprecedented transfer of corporate power between 
economic and policymaking institutions. With the decline in regulatory constraints, as well 
as the rise in constitutional rights to block attempts to impose regulatory constraints, there 
is a resurgent rise of corporate power.  The result may be a phase transition undermining 
the rule of law so critical to sustainable democracies. 
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Telecommunications regulation in the U.S., although developed as an industry-specific legal 
regime, is embedded within and relies upon coexisting enforcement of legal principles found in 
other bodies of law of general application beyond the telecommunications sector.  For this 
reason, to better understand the effects of U.S. deregulatory broadband policies, we must analyze 
the evolution of telecommunications regulation within the broader context of the evolution of 
other bodies of law applicable to general business activities. 
Cherry (2010) examines recent deregulatory broadband policies in the context of the 
evolution of the general business regulatory regime reflected in antitrust and consumer protection 
laws.  It describes how some industry-specific problems in telecommunications are not addressed 
by this general business regime, creating legal gaps that can be bridged only by construction of 
new legal obligations.  The network neutrality debate, for example, is a response to such a legal 
gap. 
The consequences of deregulatory broadband policies are also affected by important legal 
developments relating to the regulation and rights of corporations.  For example, Cherry (2011) 
examines how broadband providers will likely use an important development in federal 
constitutional law – resulting from a recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Citizens United v. FEC 
(2010), which held that corporations have the same constitutional rights for political speech as 
individuals – to block imposition of network neutrality obligations on constitutional grounds.   
This paper expands analysis beyond Citizens United v. FEC by examining important 
legal developments arising from the evolution of law as applied to corporations as a general 
matter.  It stresses that a more fundamental layer of legal developments, resulting in a 
contraction in government’s ability to regulate corporations, underlies the more recent layer of 
deregulatory broadband policies. This layer is more fundamental in the sense that its temporal 
development commenced well before the recent era of deregulatory policies, and its applicability 
extends to commercial activities as a general matter and thus beyond those of the 
communications sector.  Therefore, to understand the consequences of deregulatory broadband 
policies and the resultant contraction of available legal remedies to address behavior/activities of 
broadband providers – referred to here as legal gaps - it is necessary to consider those 
deregulatory policies in combination with legal developments affecting general corporate 





II.  Evolution of the corporate form and erosion of legal doctrines to constrain corporate 
power 
In the U.S., the states assumed the primary power to issue corporate charters (Hamill, 1999; 
Smith, 2003).  Initially, the privileges granted to corporations and the scope of corporate 
activities were strictly controlled.  However, corporations’ freedoms expanded during the 19
th 
century as the means of issuing and enforcing corporate charters evolved.  Moreover, with the 
rise of large, widely-held business corporations and of activities in interstate commerce, state 
regulation of corporation eroded with the rise of federal regulation. By the late 19
th and early 20
th 
centuries, this federal regulation consisted of industry-specific regulation of railroads, telegraphy 
and telephony under federal agency oversight, and of regulation of businesses as a general matter 
under antitrust law. 
 
A. Special Charters of Corporations and Doctrines of Their Enforcement 
Corporations are legal entities and “have always been creatures of statutes, requiring a formal 
recognition normally evidenced by a corporate charter issued by a sovereign person or 
government” (Hamill, 1999, footnote omitted).   In early colonial America, colonial corporations 
were chartered by the King of England and later by colonial assemblies (Hamill, 1999).  In the 
early United States, the states created corporate charters through individual, legislative acts. In 
corporate charters, the legislature granted privileges and specifically circumscribed the powers 
and purpose of the corporation. In this way, “corporate reliance on corporate charters afforded 
states a mechanism of regulatory control over corporations: if an entity would not accept the 
terms of its charter it could not gain the advantages of the corporate form” (Taylor, 2006, p. 
998). 
In the late 18
th and early 19
th centuries, the legal benefits of corporations were deemed 
necessary for and available to few enterprises.  “At that time, the principal legal benefits offered 
by the corporation, which were not available to partnerships, revolved around the corporation’s 
ability to exist beyond the natural life of the shareholders, to pool large amounts of capital, and 
to own property” (Hamill, 1999, p. 91, footnote omitted).  Most early special corporate charters 
were granted to accomplish some public purpose, for which special privileges or de facto 




transportation projects such as canals and turnpikes (Hamill, p. 93; Smith, 2003, pp.251-252).  
These charters granted special powers or privileges tailored to the corporation’s purpose.  For 
examples, turnpikes were granted special powers of eminent domain, limited liability and the 
right to collect tolls (Smith, 2003, p. 251-2520.  As later discussed, use of special charters for 
such purposes declined in the early 20
th century with the rise of federal regulation over activities 
such as railroads, telegraphy and telephony. 
There were various means by which these special charters were enforced.  One consisted 
of quo warranto actions, whereby the state (sovereign) may revoke corporate charters for misuse 
or nonuse (Linzey, 1995, p. 233).
1 These actions have their origins in the English common law, 
and were “based on the idea that the sovereign responsible for conferring the privilege also 
retained the right to forfeit the franchise” (Linzey, 1995, p. 240). Over time, most states enacted 
statutes, granting to an agent of the state, such as an Attorney General, the power to initiate 
proceedings to revoke charters in order to curb corporate abuses, which were widely used 
throughout the 19
th century (Linzey, 1995, pp. 223-225). 
Another means of enforcement was the ultra vires doctrine, under which “corporations 
were prohibited from doing anything that was not specifically authorized in their charters” (Cray 
and Drutman, 2005,p. 312, footnote omitted).  “The ultra vires doctrine in the corporate setting 
originated as an English common law tradition allowing shareholders or parties dealing with 
corporations to sue to enjoin or invalidate corporate acts that were outside of the activities 
specifically authorized in a corporate charter.  The ultra vires doctrine is rooted in the more 
ancient doctrine of quo warranto” (Sulkowski, 2009, p. 95, footnote omitted).  Certain 
individuals had standing to bring an action because “[t]he primary justification for the doctrine 
was the dual protection of investment interests of the company’s shareholders and security 
interests of its creditors” (Sulkowski, 2009, pp. 95-96, footnote omitted). “Lawsuits … continued 
to be used into the 1900s to restrain corporate activities” (Sulkowski, 2009, p. 98, footnote 
omitted).  In addition to injunctions, at times “courts agreed to dissolve corporations for 
illegalities into the 1890s” (Sulkowski, 2009, p. 98, footnote omitted). 
 
                                                 
1 “Quo Warranto actions are demands made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by 
what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the 
constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of grant or authority from 




B.  General Incorporation Statutes and Increasing Freedoms of Corporations 
During the 19
th century, general incorporation laws gradually replaced the special charter system 
of incorporation, although Hamill (1999) “empirically proves that incorporation by special 
charter remained a significant feature of the corporate landscape until the early twentieth 
century” (p. 86). This transformation occurred both because special charters were perceived as 
unfair in conferring privileges to only a few, and “[a]s the American economy grew … 
legislatures could not keep up with the demand for special charters” (Taylor, 2006, p. 998). 
  Initially, the switch from special to general charters developed under standard pattern 
incorporation statutes that maintained regulatory control over corporations (Taylor, 2006, p. 
999).  These statutes limited the size of corporations and imposed limitations on the stated 
purpose of the corporation.  “Any activities outside the express purpose stated in the charter were 
ultra vires.  Other common constraints … included limitations on capitalization, the types of 
shares a corporation could offer, and voting rights” (Taylor, 2006, p. 999, footnotes omitted).   
  However, “[t]he continued increase in the scale and scope of American business from 
approximately 1875 to 1930 caused states to move from using set-pattern general incorporation 
statutes to enabling incorporation” (Taylor, 2006, p. 1000, footnote omitted).  Under the general 
incorporation statutes, corporations “could structure their affairs relatively freely through careful 
drafting of their articles and bylaws; that is, states were no longer imposing stringent conditions 
on access to the corporate form” (Taylor, p. 1000, footnote omitted).   
Moreover, as agrarianism gave way to industrialization during the 19
th century, states 
competed to attract businesses to incorporate in their jurisdictions.  This led to a corporate 
charter “race to the bottom”, whereby states competed by enacting statutes that granted corporate 
charters under increasingly permissive terms.  This permissiveness accelerated when 
“[b]eginning in 1891, New Jersey enacted a series of laws that effectively relinquished its ability 
to regulate and control corporations through charters” (Cray and Drutman, 2005, p. 314).  In this 
regard, “New Jersey became the first state to allow corporations to buy and sell stock or property 
in other corporations and issue their own stock as payment, creating ‘holding companies’ that 
were crucial to the functioning of trusts” (Cray and Drutman, 2005, p. 314, footnote omitted).  
New Jersey also repealed its state antitrust law in 1892, enacted “an embarrassingly permissive” 
general incorporation statute in 1896, and “permitted companies to issue nonvoting stock, which 




permitted directors to amend bylaws with the consent of the shareholders” (Cray and Drutman, 
2005, pp. 314-315).  Although New Jersey latter attempted to revoke some of these privileges in 
1913, the decline in corporate control could not be arrested as “[m]any companies simply moved 
to Delaware, which in 1899 had adopted an even more permissive law than New Jersey – and 
offered even lower fees to incorporate” (Cray and Drutman, 2005, p. 316, footnote omitted).  “As 
a result, the corporate law of Delaware has effectively become that national corporate law for the 
past one hundred years” (Cray and Drutman, 2005, p. 316). 
As previously discussed, “charter revocation was one of the primary means used by states 
to control corporations and corporate behavior” (Thoennes, 2004, p. 223).  As further discussed 
in Section III, this means of enforcement has been significantly limited by judicial decisions on 
constitutional grounds, beginning with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819). “In addition, the circumstances under which a state can 
revoke a corporate charter have become increasingly restricted in recent years with the 
codification of quo warranto” (Thoennes, 2004, pp. 223-224). 
While the growth of general incorporation statutes diffused throughout the states, the 
ultra vires doctrine also eroded as a legal remedy.  “The most important explanation why ultra 
vires lawsuits fell out of favor was their abuse by corporations seeking to avoid contractual 
obligations” (Sulkowski, 2009, p. 99, footnote omitted).   In fact, [t]he ultra vires was at one 
point so sacrosanct that contractual obligations could be escaped even when contracts had been 
partially performed to the disadvantage of a creditor or supplier and the enrichment of the 
company” (Sulkowski, 2009, p. 99, footnote omitted).  To counter this corporate abuse of the 
doctrine states revised their statutes.  
At the same time that states revised their statutes to eliminate abuse, shareholders shifted 
reliance from ultra vires lawsuits against corporations to actions against individuals based on the 
fiduciary duties of corporate managers and directors (Sulkowski, 2009, p. 100).  With 
longstanding roots in equity, under the common law certain individuals have fiduciary duties, 
“demanding that fiduciaries comport with standards of behavior that society deems to be 
required by the fiduciary position” (Taylor, 2006, p. 1007). Corporate managers and directors 
hold such duties to shareholders, and these duties “have long been considered vital in controlling 
corporate management” (Taylor, 2006, p. 1006).  




the mid-nineteenth century with the increase in size and complexity of corporate activities” 
(Taylor, 2006, p. 1008).  This fiduciary duty included duties of care and of loyalty.  Both of these 
duties “originally placed meaningful demands on directors” (Taylor, 2006, p.1012).
2  Taylor 
(2006) explains how these duties devolved over time.  “As the conduct of corporate affairs 
became more prevalent and more complex, courts began to loosen the demands placed on 
directorial action under the duty of loyalty” (Taylor, 2006, p. 1013).   This decline in the duty of 
care from approximately 1910 to 1970 was followed by the rise of safe harbor statutes enacted in 
the 1980s and 1990s, which protected directors in self-interested transactions authorized by 
disinterested majority of directors or shareholders as fair (Taylor, 2006, p. 1016).   As to the duty 
of care, “[i]n recognition of the fact that corporate managers often must make risky decisions, … 
the law recognized that directors should not bear personal liability for those decisions that out in 
hindsight to have been ill considered” (Taylor, 2006, p. 1019, footnote omitted).  This view 
became known as the “business judgment rule”, finding managers and directors “liable only 
when they failed to exercise ‘ordinary knowledge,’ defined as ‘common sense, and ordinary 
attention’” (Taylor, 2006, p. 1011, footnote omitted).  Since the 1980s, meaningful constraints 
under the business judgment rule have been deemed virtually eliminated after the states, 
triggered by a court case in Delaware, passed statutes enabling directors to avoid personal 
liability for most breaches of the duty of care (Taylor, 2006, pp. 1021-1022). 
With all of these changes, corporations vastly expanded their freedoms. States’ power to 
revoke charters is more limited.  General incorporation statutes broadened the scope of 
permissible corporate activities as a general matter relative to the special chartering process. The 
scope of activities was further broadened by a “race to the bottom” as states competed to provide 
a more favorable forum and environment for establishing business corporations.  Shareholders 
substituted ultra vires lawsuits with actions against corporate management for breaches of 
fiduciary duties, which was also “symptomatic of a race to the bottom, in terms of restrictions on 
corporate freedom” (Sulkowski, 2009, p. 101).  In turn, the fiduciary duties of corporate 
management devolved so that “we are left with a vacuum in the area of regulatory control over 
corporate management” (Taylor, 2006, 1024). 
                                                 
2 “The duty of loyalty doctrine originally held director-fiduciaries liable for any benefits they obtained in 
the presence of a conflict of interest.  Duty of care doctrine compelled directorial concern and attention as 
to the well-being of their beneficiaries by examining the impact of directorial action on shareholders and 





C. Persistence of Special Charters for Transportation and Communications Projects Until 
Federal Regulation 
Notwithstanding the growth of general incorporation statutes, “[s]pecial charters for 
transportation and communication projects … served as one of the many tools to deal with the 
absence of federal regulatory over enterprises posing significant interstate issues” (Hamill, 1999, 
p. 147, footnote omitted).  In particular, “[t]he pattern of special charters issued, during the 1875 
and 1903 period for transportation and communication projects, with railroads being the most 
visible and important, can be attributed to the states’ attempt to regulate rates and other matters 
because of the absence of federal regulation” (Hamill, 1999, p. 147).  The communications 
projects during this period consisted of telegraphy and telephony.   
The rapid decline and ultimate disappearance of these special charters during the early 
20
th century “was aided by the replacement of special chartering and other ineffective state 
regulatory mechanisms with effective federal regulation over the nation’s railroads” (Hamill, 
1999, p. 154). In 1885, Congress created a special Senate Select Committee on Interstate 
Commerce, popularly known as the Cullom Committee (named after Sen. Cullom), to review the 
economic abuses associated with large corporations, particularly with regard to the railroad 
industry (Schwartz, 1973, p. 31). In early 1886, the Cullom Committee issued its report, known 
as the Cullom Report.  The Cullom Report provides a comprehensive record of the committee’s 
investigation and recommendation for federal legislation, which was limited to the railroad 
industry. Later that same year, a definitive ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wabash, St. 
Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois (1886) – that the States lacked jurisdiction to regulate 
railroad transportation in interstate commerce – further precipitated a crisis for Congress to act.  
The following year Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 based on the 
recommendation of the Committee. 
In the Cullom Report, the Committee emphasized that the general question of policy 
before them was how to control the growth and influence of corporate power and to regulate its 
relations to the public.
3  The Report identified various reasons for federal regulation of interstate 
                                                 
3 Stated in its entirety, “The interest everywhere manifested in its investigation has convinced the 
committee that no general question of governmental policy occupies at this time so prominent a place in 
the thoughts of the people as that of controlling the steady growth and extending influence of corporate 




commerce.  These reasons included the importance of railroads to commerce, the inadequacy of 
common law remedies for customers under the common law of common carriage, the lack of 
state jurisdiction over interstate commerce, and the insufficiency of competition to protect 
customers from discriminatory and oppressive practices (Cullom Report, 1886, pp. 176-180).  
Following the recommendation of the Cullom Report, Congressed enacted the Interstate 
Commerce Act (ICA) of 1887, creating the first federal regulatory commission, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC), with authority over railroads.  The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 
later extended the ICC’s regulatory authority to telegraphy and telephony. Subsequently, in the 
Communications Act of 1934, which created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
Congress retained the same framework of common carriage regulation and transferred 
jurisdiction of telegraphy and telephony from the ICC to the FCC. 
 
D. The Rise of Federal Antitrust Law 
Because the ICA provided a federal regulatory framework only for the railroad industry in 
interstate commerce, the policy question of how to regulate corporate power in general had been 
deferred.  Only three years after passage of the ICA, Congress responded with passage of the 
first federal statute to regulate interstate commerce for general businesses, the Sherman Act of 
1890. For interstate commerce generally, Congress identified problems similar to those 
encountered in addressing the railroad problem. Congressional response was necessary due to the 
inadequacy of common law remedies and the lack of State jurisdiction over interstate commerce 
(Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2000, §104a). 
The Sherman Act was enacted to prevent restraints on competition arising from the 
conduct of large businesses, often organized as “trusts”, that were organized to suppress 
competition and had monopolistic tendencies. However, Congress faced the challenge of 
designing a statutory framework to achieve the intended purposes.  Given the lack of relevant 
preexisting federal common law, the “[c]reation of a new federal jurisdiction inevitably required 
the courts to receive, apply, and develop ‘the common law’ in the same way that a new 
                                                                                                                                                             
the public eye, and as there are none whose operations so directly affect every citizen in the daily pursuit 
of his business or avocation as the corporations engaged in transportation, they naturally receive the most 





jurisdiction customarily does” (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 1995, §302, p. 4).
4 The brevity of the 
legislation – to prohibit every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade and to 
prohibit monopolization of any part of trade in interstate commerce – and its subsequent 
enforcement by the courts for over a century support this characterization.  The Sherman Act 
provided the statutory foundation for a new body of law that provided flexibility to evolve in the 
courts consistent with the common law tradition. 
 
III. Evolution of corporations’ constitutional rights to block government regulation 
The U.S. Constitution contains direct and indirect limitations on government power.  The 
indirect limitations are reflected in the separation of powers among three branches of 
government, the original purpose of which was to protect individuals from the arbitrary exercise 
of government power (Cherry and Wildman, 2000, pp. 66-67).  The direct limitations expressly 
constrain government power, such as in the Bill of Rights, the purpose of which is to give 
priority of certain individual interests over those of government (Cherry and Wildman, 2000, p. 
67).  An important means of blocking government regulation is to seek a judicial judgment that 
the relevant assertion of government power is unconstitutional. 
The enforcement of constitutional principles on behalf of corporations can have both 
beneficial and harmful consequences from a societal perspective.  On the one hand, enforcement 
of constitutional principles can facilitate the creation of an environment that more sustainably 
supports investment in and development of commercial activities of great benefit to society.  For 
example, as Cherry and Wildman (2000) explains in great depth, enforcement of constitutional 
principles limits vulnerability of private parties from expropriation of property by government.  
Protection from expropriation is particularly important to enable private investment in critical 
infrastructures – such as public utilities, which under U.S. law includes the provision of 
railroads, telegraphy, telephony, and electricity. 
On the other hand, enforcement of constitutional rights enables parties to externalize the 
effects of their behavior onto society.  This paper examines how corporations have used 
constitutional challenges to block, in its entirety or in part, the exercise of government power to 
                                                 
4 For this reason, Areeda and Hovenkamp assert that "the Sherman Act may be seen not as a prohibition 
of any specific conduct but as a general authority to do what common law courts usually do: to use certain 
customary techniques of technical reasoning, to consider the reasoning and results of other common law 




regulate certain corporate activities.  It then explains how the growing recognition of 
corporations’ constitutional rights, when combined with other developments that have either 
eroded state legal remedies or forgone federal regulation, has acutely circumscribed the scope of 
legal remedies to constrain the behavior of providers of broadband Internet access services.  This 
section briefly reviews the evolution of corporations’ constitutional rights, restricting discussion 
to seminal legal developments most relevant to those rights of broadband providers that are 
likely to constrain government regulation of their activities. 
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), “the Court laid the framework for 
weakening the common law principle of retention of sovereign power over state chartered 
corporations” (Linzey, 1995, p. 231, footnote omitted).  In this case, the Court “held that a 
corporate charter ‘is a contract, the obligation of which cannot be impaired without violating the 
Constitution of the United States’” (p. 230, footnote omitted; citing the opinion, 17 U.S. at 650).  
Thus, under the Contract Clause,
5 a “charter could not be revoked or privileges withdrawn 
without some just reason” (Linzey, 1995, p. 231, fn 56), and “[n]o longer would the corporation 
created by the sovereign be subjected to arbitrary interference” (Linzey, 1995, p. 232).  Thus, the 
Contract Clause limits the state’s power to revoke charters under actions of quo warranto or the 
ultra vires doctrine. 
Santa Clara County v. South Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886), is considered the 
first case in which the U.S. “Supreme Court recognized corporate personhood as conferring 
constitutional rights” (Cray and Drutman, 2005, p. 318, footnote omitted).   In particular, Santa 
Clara County has been cited for the proposition that corporations are persons under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
6  Noteworthy is the timing and context of this 
case; the case was brought by a railroad company, and decided during the period of 
transformation to from small to large business corporations and in the same year that the Cullom 
                                                 
5 The Contract Clause provides that “No State shall … pass any … Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts” (U.S. Constitution, Art I. Sec. 10, Clause 1). 
6 The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part that “No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (Clause 1).  Upon closer inspection, this case provides a 
dubious basis for precedent as the case is cited for a proposition that is reflected only in a cursory 
statement from the U.S. Supreme Court Justice during oral argument and not part of the Court’s legal 




Report was issued by the U.S. Senate.  “In establishing the doctrine of ‘corporate personhood,’ 
the  Santa Clara court provided corporations with a potentially powerful new shield against 
public accountability” (Cray and Drutman, 2005, p. 318, footnote omitted).  Indeed, soon 
thereafter in other cases, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically recognized corporations as persons 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment (Krannich, 
2005, pp. 93-94).  In many of these cases, railroad companies were again the plaintiffs 
(Krannich, 2005, p. 94; Thoennes, 2004, pp. 210-211, fn. 50). 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides in relevant 
part: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  In early 
cases, takings were found only when government exercised its eminent domain power to directly 
appropriate property.  In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922), for the first time “the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a taking could occur by virtue of overreaching regulation through 
government’s use of its police power” (Cherry and Wildman, 2000, p. 70).  In subsequent cases, 
the Takings Clause has been used to invalidate actions of state and federal agencies, including 
those with jurisdiction over public utilities (Cherry and Wildman, 2000, pp. 70-74). 
Finally, cases holding that corporations have free speech rights are of more recent 
vintage.  The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no 
law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  The First Amendment has also been 
held applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as in 
Near v. Minnesota (1931). Freedom of speech not only protects individual interests, but also 
serves the public purpose of sustaining a constitutional democracy (Cherry & Wildman, 2000, p. 
88).  With regard to corporations engaged in communications, newspapers have the highest level 
of constitutional protection, given the separate Free Press Clause in the First Amendment. Aside 
from the press, the level of free speech rights for mass media providers differs among technology 
platforms, where government is required to meet a higher level of judicial scrutiny to justify 
regulation for cable providers than broadcast providers (Botein, 1998, pp. 292-456). In some 
circumstances, even free speech rights for telephone companies have been used to invalidate or 
constrain government regulation.  These include invalidating a federal ban on the sales of 
television programming by telephone companies directly to their customers,
7 and holding that a 
                                                 






state utility commission’s requirement that a telephone company help spread a message to which 
it disagrees in its bill inserts to customers violated the utility’s free speech rights.
8   
  Another important line of free speech cases involves the rights of corporations to 
participate in political activities.  In this regard, political speech – unlike commercial speech –
receives the highest level of First Amendment protection.  There has been “precedent for 
restricting the free speech rights of corporations to a greater extent than natural persons for 
reasons directed related to unique characteristics of the corporate form” (Cherry and Wildman, 
2000, p. 273, footnote omitted).  More specifically, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
(1990), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Michigan statute that prohibited certain corporations 
from using corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures in support or opposition of 
candidates in state elections.  The Court found this restriction on corporations’ political speech 
was justified because the state had a compelling interest in preventing a specific type of 
corruption arising from unique characteristics of corporations.   Although the state statute did not 
apply to media corporations, the Court implied that its application to them could potentially be 
constitutional as well (Cherry and Wildman, 2000, p. 274).  However, in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission (2010), the U.S. Supreme Court overruled some of its prior cases, 
including Austin, to hold that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons with 
regard to political speech.  Cherry (2010) discusses the implications of Citizens United for 
network neutrality rules, as broadband providers are likely to raise a constitutional challenge to 
such rules on free speech grounds. 
  Thus, under the evolution of constitutional law, corporations have been recognized as 
having some constitutional rights that provide an important means for blocking government 
regulation.
9  Therefore, as state regulation of corporations eroded under the rise of federal 
regulation, federal regulation has also been increasingly limited by the rising recognition of 
corporate constitutional rights.   
 
                                                 
8 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
9 Corporations also have protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment; the right 
to a jury trial, a speedy trial, a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment; and protection from excessive 
fines under the Eighth Amendment. However, “purely personal” constitutional rights have not been 
extended to corporations when the function of the right was to protect individuals.  Examples include the 
privilege against self-incrimination, right to privacy, (less protection from) unreasonable search and 





IV. Forsaking industry-specific regulatory power under deregulatory policies  
Against this backdrop of replacing state law remedies over corporations by federal law, in the 
latter portion of the 20
th century and continuing in the 21
st century there has been a retrenchment 
from availability of federal remedies.  One mechanism of retrenchment is the rise in recognition 
of constitutional rights for corporations discussed in section III.  Another is the federal 
government’s forsaking of its remaining (constitutionally permissible) power under deregulatory 
policies.   
Deregulatory policies have reduced or eliminated industry-specific regulatory power. In 
this regard, policies of federal preemption block state legal remedies.  Since enactment of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, examples include the FCC’s classification of broadband 
Internet access services as information services, and FCC’s preemption of VOIP regulation. 
In reducing or eliminating industry-specific regulatory power, deregulatory policies also 
shift reliance to economic competition and legal remedies available under other bodies of state 
and federal law applicable to general businesses.  Yet, by this time, as discussed in sections II 
and III, the availability of certain federal and state remedies had already been contracting.   
Further contraction of available federal and state remedies is continuing under recent U.S. 
Supreme Court and federal Circuit Court of Appeals decisions.   
Cherry (2010) discusses legal gaps in shifting reliance from industry-specific regulation 
of telecommunications and broadband access services to general business regulation under 
antitrust and consumer protection laws. These laws share a common purpose to facilitate the 
exercise of effective consumer choice in a market economy (Averitt and Lande, 1997, p. 713).   
The antitrust laws are intended to ensure that the marketplace remains 
competitive, so that a meaningful range of options is made available to 
consumers, unimpaired by practices such as price fixing or anticompetitive 
mergers.  The consumer protection laws are then intended to ensure that 
consumers can choose effectively from among those options, with their critical 
faculties unimpaired by such violations as deception or the withholding of 
material information.  Protection at both levels is needed in order to ensure that a 
market economy can continue to operate effectively.  (Averitt and Lande, 1997, 
pp. 713-714) 
 
Since enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the legal gaps include loss or 
uncertainty of remedies under consumer protection law, where there is a conflict among the 




(Cherry, 2010, pp. 14-15).
10 In addition, U.S. Supreme Court decisions have created new 
uncertainties for enforcement of federal antitrust law, such as the uncertain viability of the 
essential facilities doctrine in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko (2004), and the Court’s 
announcement of essentially a new pleading rule in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 
(Cherry, 2011, pp. 15-17).  
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	)##			ignores coexistence of the industry-specific regime of common carriage at 
the time that the FAA was enacted in 1925 – where there were three mechanisms for consumer 
remedies (in the courts, through arbitration, or before federal or state commissions) including 
class actions – and thus the severity of the loss of consumers’ legal remedies as a result of its 
decision. 
Thus, shrinking industry-specific regulation is being accompanied by the contraction of 
remedies under antitrust and consumer protection laws.  For this reason, increased reliance on 
forms of general business regulation – the intention of deregulatory policies - is misplaced.  
 
V. Bridging the growing legal gaps 
This section reviews options for addressing the growing legal gaps in available state or federal 
law legal remedies with regard to activities of broadband providers.  The most direct and 
effective option is to reinstitute some industry-specific regulation.  This option could be 
accomplished by restoring FCC jurisdiction, either by FCC reclassification of broadband Internet 
access service as a telecommunications service (that is, as having a telecommunications service 
component) or by specific act of Congress. Alternatively, Congress could directly impose 
                                                 
10 The filed rate doctrine originated with interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and was 
subsequently applied under the Communications Act of 1934.  Under the filed rate doctrine, all rates, 
terms and conditions in tariffs are considered lawful, with no deviation permitted even under legal claims 




specific legal obligations on broadband Internet access service providers under a rationale likely 
to survive a constitutional challenge under the Free Speech Clause.  Classification of broadband 
Internet access service as a common carrier service would help in this regard, particularly if the 
recent FCC rules are stricken upon judicial review (Cherry, 2011, pp. 635-636). 
As for antitrust and consumer protection laws applicable to businesses as a general 
matter, Congress could enact laws to overrule holdings in various court decisions.  For example, 
Congress could revise the Federal Arbitration Act to permit state law consumer protection laws 
and/or common law actions to void enforcement of certain contract clauses, effectively restoring 
legal remedies based on unconscionability, particularly as to contracts of adhesion.  Such clauses 
include mandatory arbitration, prohibition of class arbitration or judicial class actions, and 
exculpatory clauses or severe limits on liability.  Congress could also revise antitrust law to 
expressly recognize the essential facilities doctrine, and too counter US Supreme Court’s change 
in plaintiffs’ pleading requirements. 
Finally, some efforts could be made to directly constrain corporate power. One option is 
the revival of historical legal remedies. For example, in the context of corporate actions that 
harm the environment, Linzey (1997) asserts “it is essential that citizens rediscover the tools 
originally used to keep corporations politically subordinate to citizen control” (p. 41).  In this 
regard, he observes that quo warranto state statutes still exist in 49 states and the District of 
Columbia under which corporate charters could be revoked.  Moreover, through revision of state 
quo warranto statutes, Linzey (1995) “proposes a quasi-private cause of action where citizens 
could obtain judicial review of the [state] Attorney General’s decision not to bring a revocation 
action” (pp. 226-227).   This option could also be applied to corporate actions in other contexts. 
A less likely and more politically difficult option is to narrow or even eliminate certain 
constitutional rights of corporations. This option would require amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution and/or reversals of precedent by the U.S. Supreme Court.   The occurrence of either 










Cherry (2008) examines the challenge for institutional governance under deregulatory policies, 
which has been intensified by the adverse effects of the social acceleration of time.
11 This 
challenge consists of providing regulatory resilience through regulatory structures and policies of 
increased adaptability yet maintaining the rule of law. This challenge “needs to be viewed more 
generally in terms of new developments in the co-evolution of markets and policymaking 
systems that are pressing for a phase transition in their interrelationship” (p. 3).   
  Cherry (2011) expands analysis to consider the combinatorial effects of the FCC’s 
decision to classify broadband Internet access services as information services and the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, finding that expansion of corporations’ free speech 
rights likely enhances broadband providers’ ability to successfully challenge the FCC’s recent 
network neutrality rules on constitutional grounds.  The present paper broadens inquiry to 
consider the likely combinatorial effects of deregulatory broadband policies and the evolution of 
law as applied to corporations as a general matter.  In this regard, it explains how legal 
developments in both areas have dismantled bodies of law or doctrines that had developed to 
address corporate power in both commercial and political spheres and to protect consumers from 
vulnerability in commercial activities.  Moreover, the coexistence of these developments enables 
an unprecedented transfer of corporate power between economic and policymaking institutions. 
With the decline in regulatory constraints, as well as the rise in constitutional rights to block 
attempts to impose regulatory constraints, there is a resurgent rise of corporate power.  The result 
may be a phase transition undermining the rule of law so critical to sustainable democracies. 
                                                 
11 Scheuerman (2004, p. xv) defines the social acceleration of time as “a long-term yet relatively recent 
historical process consisting of three central elements: technological acceleration (e.g. the heightening of 
the rate of technological innovation), the acceleration of social change (referring to accelerated patterns of 
basic change in the workplace, e.g.), and the acceleration of everyday life (e.g. via new means of high-
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